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CASE COMMENTS

TORTS: TRESPASS TO THE PERSON ACCOMPANIED
BY TRESPASS TO LAND
St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello,
44 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1950)
A truck driver of defendant company, while trespassing upon the
property of plaintiff's father, seriously injured plaintiff, aged five.
Two counts for personal injuries were advanced: one for negligence
in operating the truck, and one for "trespass." From an adverse judgment, which was rendered despite defendantes contentions of unavoidable accident and contributory negligence, he appealed, assigning as errors inter alia the submission of the case to the jury on the
trespass count and the ruling sustaining demurrer to the contributory
negligence plea to this count. HELD, neither unavoidable accident nor
contributory negligence is a defense to an action of trespass for injuries
inflicted by a trespasser to land upon a member of the landowners
household.' Judgment affirmed.
Both the Court and the pleadings refer to trespass only, without
specifying any particular type. At first glance either of two seems
possible: trespass quare clausum fregit, with resulting personal injuries in aggravation of damages; and trespass to the person, with the
defenses of unavoidable accident, or no negligence, and of contributory negligence ruled out because this trespass is committed concurrently with trespass to land of the head of the household of the
party injured.
Confusion in analysis results from loose use of the single word
"trespass" to denote any of the several types of trespass, and from the
necessity of proving both trespass to the person and trespass to land
in a factual situation of this nature. The primary difficulty stems
from the failure to realize that two plaintiffs are possible, and that
their respective causes of action are distinct. When the landowner is
also the party injured, the issue is simple; he can bring trespass
quare clausum fregit, with his damages aggravated by the injury to
his person. But when the landowners person is not harmed, the pain
and suffering of his cbild can hardly be said to constitute injury to
1
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court approved refusal by the trial judge to disturb
the findings of negligence and of absence of contributory negligence on the first
count, which alleged negligent operation of the truck, the disposition of the
defenses to the second count is properly an alternative holding.
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him, although his recovery does properly embrace medical bills and
loss of services of the child. 2 Indeed, in a companion case the father
3
of the Cuccinello child did recover medical expenses.
The plaintiff in the instant case, however, was the child. She
neither owned nor possessed the property, legally or constructively;
and to hold that anyone merely on the property lawfully, whether
household member, invitee or licensee, can bring trespass quare
clausum fregit flies in the teeth of centuries of established real property
law.4 In any event, the instant case is a landmark in the law; and it
is submitted that when the decision is on the theory of trespass to the
person it is sound law.
Trespass quare clausum fregit, with or without force, is the
appropriate remedy for wrongful disturbance of possession of realty.
Improper entry is the gist of this action and must first be established;
whatever physical damage the trespass occasions to the property
merely aggravates the damages at law. 5 The trespasser can escape
liability neithei by showing that he exercised due care while on the7
land 6 nor by proving that he contemplated no damage to the property.
Whether the injuries result directly from his wrongful entry is a jury
question." Whether he foresaw the consequences of his act or even
knew that he was trespassing is irrelevant as regards actual damage. 9
Furthermore, contributory negligence of the landowner is no defense, 10
In addition to recovering for
though it may mitigate the damages."
the wrongful entry, the plaintiff can claim damages by way of
2

E.g., Wilkie v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225 (1926).
St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Anthony Cuccinello, 44 So.2d 677

3

(Fla. 1950). The per curiam opinion cites the principal case as the sole authority.
Sed quaere whether the theory of his case actually was the same; there was no
trespass to his person at all.
4
E.g., Ware v. Collins, 85 Miss. 223, 72 Am. Dec. 122 (1858).
5
E.g., Harlow v. Pulsifer, 122 Me. 472, 120 At. 621 (1928); see Dixie Constr.
Co. v. McCauley, 211 Ala. 683, 101 So. 601 (1924); Newsom v. Meyer, 102 Conn.
93, 128 AU. 699 (1925) (recovery for both direct and indirect damage allowed
for entry vi et armis, damages not the usual consequence of the act to be specially
claimed, however).
6
E.g., Wyant v. Crouse, 127 Mich. 158, 86 N.W. 527 (1901).
7
E.g., Lee & Jernigan v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E.2d 804 (1940).
8
E.g., Lesch v. Great Northern R.R., 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906).
9
E.g., Snow v. Pulitzer, 142 N.Y. 263, 36 N.E. 1059 (1894).
'oSchile v. Brokhahus, 80 N.Y. 614 (1880); Henley v. Wilson, 81 N.C. 405
(1879).

"1Henley v. Wilson, 81 N.C. 405 (1879).
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aggravation for loss of profits,' 2 for injury to his person' 3 or to his.
character,' 4 and even for loss of services of a daughter seduced during
the trespass.' 5
The gist of the action of trespass to the person is the personal injury;
and to this action either absence of negligence on the part of the
defendant or contributory negligence of the plaintiff is a valid defense,16 unless, of course, the trespass is intentional. When, however,
trespass to the person occurs at the same time that defendant is
trespassing on the land of the head of the household of the party
injured, authorities differ sharply on the legal result. The problem is
whether this additional factor of concurrent trespass to land bars the
normal defenses of unavoidable accident and contributory negligence
of the injured individual. The familiar Nitro-Glycerine Case1 7 and
textual authorities in accord with it' s mark a break in the doctrine of
strict liability. The Restatement of Torts, on the other hand, imposes
liability in any event,' 9 although it carefully avoids stating precisely
who should sue and what form of action should be used.
The closest approach to clear analysis of the cause of action appears
in Engle v. Simmons,20 in which a pregnant wife brought an action
for pain and suffering caused by unlawful intrusion of a bill collector
into her absent husband's house, even though no physical violence
' 2 Snow v. Pulitzer, 142 N.Y. 263, 86 N.E. 1059 (1894); Schile v. Brokhahus,
80 N.Y. 614 (1880).
l8 Reed v. Peoria & 0. R.R., 18 11. 403 (1857).
14Faulkner v. Alderson, Gilmer 222 (Va. 1821).
' 5 Mercer v. Walnsley, 5 Harris & J.21 (Md. 1820).
'0 E.g., Hester v. Hall, 17 Ala. App. 25, 81 So. 361 (1919); Cornell v. First
Nat.17Bank of Miami, 121 Fla. 192, 163 So. 482 (1935).
Parrott v. Wells Fargo & Co., 15 Wall. 524 (U.S. 1872).
'8 E.g., Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 16 Am. Rep. 372 (1873); Losee v.
Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476; 10 Am. Rep. 623 (1873); see Paossun, HABoox ov Tim
LAw oF Tours §13 (1941).
19§380, comment c. This illustration is given: "A is driving his car along the
highway in a neighborhood with which he is unfamiliar. He asks B to direct him
to a certain town. B tells him that he can take a short cut through a private road
over which the public is not accustomed to travel which B asserts to be upon his
own land but which, in fact, is on the land of C. While driving carefully along
the road, he runs over D, C's three-year-old child, who suddenly dashes out from
the bushes which border the road. A is liable to D and to C.'
20148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906); cf. Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89
N.W. 1068 (1902); Lesch v. Great Northern R.R., 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955
(1906); Keesecker v. G. M. McKelvey Co., 141 Ohio St. 162, 47 N.E.2d 211
(1943).
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took place. 2 ' The court, in reversing the sustention of demurrer to
the amended complaint, stated: "The suit is for an injury to the plaintiff, not for a trespass to the realty.
... 22 The theory of the case
is almost certainly trespass to the person of the wife accompanied by
trespass to the land of her husband.
Going a step further, an employee injured as a result of a willful
and malicious trespass to the land of his employer can recover even
though no injury to the person was intended by the wrongdoer and
the accident causing such injury was unavoidable. 23 A mentally
deficient child can recover for injuries sustained by walking off an
enclosed sun-porch, the outer door to which is left open by a misdirected deliveryman, provided the jury finds him a trespasser upon
the land of her father rather than a licensee. 24 The concurring opinion
cites the Restatement of Torts as authority for extending the protection
25
to members of the landowner's household.
No cases have been found in support of the instant holding that
contributory negligence is no defepse to an action for personal injuries
to a member of the landowner's household while trespass to land is
being committed. Indeed, strong dictum to the contrary appears in

Brackett v. Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corp.,28- in which the landowner himself sought recovery for injuries to him resulting from
trespass to his land. Although the Restatement of Torts holds the
trespasser to land liable to members of the landowner's household for
injuries resulting from his wrongful entry, regardless of whether his
conduct would create liability if he were not a trespasser, 27 this
28
proposed extension of the law has not escaped criticism.
21

As to the type of injury constituting direct or natural result, see Clifford v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 197 Ky. 828, 248 S.W. 180 (1923) (trespasser relieved
of liability for injuries received by landowner's wife, who pursued him until she
became exhausted, fell, and was injured thereby).
22
Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 94, 41 So. 1023 (1906).
23
Munger v. Baker, 65 Barb. 539 (N.Y. 1873) (injury next day from defendant's nocturnal uncoupling of freight cars while trespassing held direct result).
24
Keesecker v. G. M. McKelvey Co., 141 Ohio St. 162, 47 N.E.2d 211 (1943)
(jury to decide whether trespass is proximate cause of injuries).
25
Keesecker v. G. M. McKelvey Co., 141 Ohio St. 162, 169, 47 N.E.2d 211,

215 (1943).
2

GSee 87 N.H. 173, 174, 175 At. 822, 823 (1934) (judgment for plaintiff,
apparently on theory of trespass to the person; contributory negligence specifically

not found by jury).
27See note 19 supra.
288 PnocErMiNcs A. L. I. 210 et seq. (1930).
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The instant case nevertheless pursues the modem trend toward
29 It
stricter liability evidenced in the field of automobile accidents.
presents practitioners with a potent means of avoiding the defenses
of unavoidable accident and of contributory negligence in factual
situations of this type. Once a wrongful entry is established, a member of the landowner's household may bring trespass to the person
for injuries resulting from the trespass to land. On the other hand, a
physically harmed landowner himself may bring trespass quare
clausum fregit and allege his injuries by way of aggravation. In either
event, by virtue of the combination of trespass to the person and
trespass to land, the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory negligence of the plaintiff are both ruled
out as possible defenses.
V. Monms SMaT, JR.

BOOK REVIEWS
Somz

oI'oBrms

or EQurry. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Ann Arbor.

University of Michigan Law School. 1950. Pp. xiv, 380, table of
cases and index. $4.50.
Today much attention is being focused on procedural reform to the
end that a more expeditious justice may be made available for all.
But the law needs more than to be expedited. A juster justice, geared
to the social needs of our time, should be included in any program of
law reform. In past centuries equity was the principal engine for the
reform of the substantive law of the English legal system. But of
recent years the tendency has been to leave substantive reform to
legislation, and many of the tools of equity have become dulled by
the accumulated scale of rules long since outmoded.
In the series of lectures reprinted in Some Problems of Equity,
Professor Chafee, who in former years almost singlehandedly brought
about the modernization of interpleader, brings the hone of his pragmatic mind to bear on a number of other weapons of equity and
points the way toward refurbishing them for more useful service in
the hands of today's jurists.
2

0See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALz L. J. 549 (1948), and cases therein cited.
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